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MARRIAGE EQUALITY COMES TO VIRGINIA 
Carl Tobias * 
IN'I'IWDUC'rION 
Marriage equality is sweeping the United States. Across 2014, 
numerous federal circuit and district court judges throughout 
America invalidated state constitutional bans or legislative re-
strictions which proscribe same-sex marriage. Accordingly, it was 
predictable that Judge Wright Allen of the United States District 
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia would rule that Virgin-
ia's prohibitions were unconstitutional and enjoin their enforce-
ment on February 13,1 even as the jurist stayed her decision.2 
Marriage equality in Virginia comprises a significant legal issue 
and has telling effects on numerous people, but its status re-
mained less than clear until recently. Marriage equality in the ju-
risdiction deserves analysis, which this piece undertakes. 
Part I of this article chronicles marriage equality's rise and de-
velopment nationally. It ascertains that challenges, which fos-
tered the invalidation of marriage prohibitions that essentially 
govern nearly all jurisdictions, including Virginia, have triggered 
some controversy. Part II scrutinizes Judge Wright Allen's resolu-
tion of the Virginia litigation and the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit determination, which affirmed her 
ruling. This portion finds that the district jurist comprehensively 
assessed the relevant legal and factual issues when striking down 
* Williams Chair in Law, University of Richmond School of Law. I wish to thank 
Peggy Sanner for exceptional ideas, Thomas DiStanislao and Katie Lehnen for valuable 
research, Leslee Stone for excellent processing, and Russell Williams and the Hunton Wil-
liams Summer Endowment Fund for generous, continuing support. Remaining errors are 
mine. 
1. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 483-85 (E.D. Va. 2014); see Robert Barnes, 
Federal Judge Strikes Down Va. Ban on Gay Marriage, WASH. POST (Feb. 14, 2014), http:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal-judge-strikes-down-va-ban-on-gay-marriage/201 
4/02/13/c65b767 4-9528- l le3-83b9- lf024193b b84_story.html?hpid=zl. 
2. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
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the proscription while the Fourth Circuit appropriately upheld 
her opinion. Part III then derives lessons from the story recount-
ed because it ascertains that marriage equality in Virginia has 
clarified, even as the national landscape continues to be relatively 
unclear. Part IV proffers suggestions for the future. 
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF MARRIAGE EQUALITY 
A. United States v. Windsor 
The history of marriage equality warrants comparatively lim-
ited review in this article because others have thoroughly ex-
plored the background,3 and the current situation is most im-
portant. The 2013 United States v. Windsor Supreme Court 
opinion4 provoked the recent wave of marriage equality lawsuits, 
while that determination has concomitantly figured prominently 
in the rulings which numerous appellate and district court judges 
have authored invalidating the bans.5 The litigation has appar-
ently been organic, with challenges pursued in all of the states 
that prohibit same-sex marriage.6 
The Windsor majority held that section three in the Defense of 
Marriage Act ("DOMA") violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 It 
was unclear about the proper level of scrutiny, but the majority 
seemed to deploy elevated, albeit less than strict, scrutiny.8 The 
Court found insufficient justification for the imposition on dignity 
3. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKIUDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF 
THE CLOSE'!' (1999); MICHAEL KLARMAN, FROM THE CLOSET TO THE ALTAR: COURTS, 
BACKLASH, AND THE STHUGGLE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE (2013); MARC SOLOMON, 
WINNING MAHRIAGE: THE INSIDE STOHY OF How SAME-SEX COUPLES TOOK ON THE 
POLITICIANS AND PUNDITS-AND WON (2014). 
4. 570 U.S._, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
5. See Cary Franklin, Marrying Liberty and Equality: The New Jurisprudence of Gay 
Rights, 100 VA. L. REV. 817, 870-74 (2014). 
6. The ACLU has pursued much litigation, but local individuals and counsel have 
filed a number of cases. David Boies and Theodore Olson assisted Virginia counsel in the 
Eastern District suit, while the ACLU filed the Western District case. Harris v. Rainey, 
299 F.R.D. 486 (W.D. Va. 2014); see Robert Barnes, Second Judge Ponders Virginia's 
Same-Sex Marriage Ban, WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2014), http:l/www.washingtonpost.com/pol 
itics/second-judge-ponders-virginias-same-sex-marriage-ban/2014/02/19/f930b3a6-9989-
1 le3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html. 
7. See 570 U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2696; see Michael Klarman, Windsor and Brown: 
Marriage Equality and Racial Equality, 127 HARV. L. REV. 127, 140 (2013). 
8. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2693-96; Franklin, supra note 5, at 872. 
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that DOMA exacted and believed the injury visited upon same-
sex couples and their children was troubling.9 While the majority 
failed to specifically mention state-level bans, it waxed eloquent 
about the value of federalism. 10 This treatment left unclear pre-
cisely what effect, if any, Windsor had on the state proscriptions, 
although marriage equality champions seized upon the opinion 
when attacking bans and courts relied on Windsor to invalidate 
prohibitions. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts ex-
pressly remarked that the question of state marriage laws' consti-
tutionality was not before the Court,11 while Justice Scalia 
agreed, but contended that the arguments employed when invali-
dating DOMA could similarly apply to state proscriptions.12 On 
the same day, the Court did not reach the merits of an appeal 
that sought to invalidate California's ban, as a majority found the 
petitioners lacked standing to appeal. 13 
B. The Federal Challenges to State Bans 
Twenty-seven district courts have fully invalidated prohibitions 
and several others have partially done so, but only Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana and District of Puerto Rico judges have found 
bans constitutional.14 The Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Cir-
cuits have affirmed district court opinions, even as the Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee decisions 
striking down proscriptions in a case which the Justices agreed to 
hear on January 16, 2015.15 However, appeals currently are pend-
9. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2694-95. 
10. Id.; see infra note 190 and accompanying text. 
11. Windsor, 570 U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2696 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); see Klar-
man, supra note 7, at 158. 
12. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2697 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Franklin, 
supra note 5, at 870. 
13. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2668 (2013). See generally 
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The Ninth Circuit's Perry Decision and the Constitutional Poli-
tics of Marriage Equality, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 93 (2012) (discussing the merits of Per-
ry in the lower court where the Ninth Circuit struck down California's Proposition 8 on 
equal protection grounds), available at http://www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/perry-
marriage-equality. 
14. Conde-Vidal v. Garcia-Padilla, 2014 WL 5361987 at *11 (D.P.R. Oct. 21, 2014); 
Robicheaux v. Caldwell, 2 F. Supp. 3d 910, 927-28 (E.D. La. 2014); see ALLIANCE FOR 
JUSTICE, FEDE!l.AL CHALLENGES TO STATE SAME-SEX MAHRIAGE BANS (2015), available at 
http:l/www.afj.org/reports/latest-updates-love-and-the-law. 
15. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. 
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 
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ing before the First, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.rn 
The jurists who invalidated bans found that they violated due 
process or equal protection with most applying a form of height-
ened scrutiny. 17 
In December 2013, a Utah district judge issued the first opin-
ion that rejected a ban. 18 The next month, an Oklahoma trial 
court jurist struck down the state's ban. 19 During February 2014, 
a Texas district court judge, as well as Judge Wright Allen of the 
Eastern District of Virginia, invalidated those jurisdictions' pro-
hibitions.20 The following month, a Michigan jurist deemed its ban 
unconstitutional.21 In May, district courts in Idaho, Oregon, and 
Pennsylvania overturned the states' restrictions. 22 During June, 
Indiana and Wisconsin judges ascertained that the jurisdictions' 
bans were unconstitutional. 23 In July, Colorado and Kentucky ju-
rists invalidated those states' prohibitions. 21 During August, a 
Florida judge found its ban violated the Constitution. 25 Through-
out October, Alaska, Arizona, North Carolina, and Wyoming ju-
F.3d 648, 656 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S. 
Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-277); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 472-73 (9th Cir. 2014); Bishop v. 
Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 
271 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-136). The Sixth Circuit consolidated the Kentucky, Michi-
gan, Ohio, and Tennessee decisions in a case styled as DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th 
Cir. 2014). These decisions were Bourhe v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542 (W.D. Ky. 2014), 
DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Mich. 2014), Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. 
Supp. 2d 968 (S.D. Ohio 2014), and 1'anco v. Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759 (M.D. Tenn. 2014). 
'fhe Supreme Court granted certiorari to each on January 16, 2015. Bourke v. Beshear, 
135 S. Ct. 1041 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-574); DeBoer v. Snyder, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (U.S. 
Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 1039 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 
14-556); 'fanco v. Haslam, 135 S. Ct. 1040 (U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-562). 
16. See Conde-Vidal, 2014 WL 5361987, at *10-11; Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 
4:14-CV-04081-KES, 2015 WL 144567, at *11 (D.S.D. 2015); supra note 12; infra notes 18, 
20, 25, 28 and accompanying text. 
17. This article emphasizes the Fourth Circuit opinion. See infra Part II.B. 
18. Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1216 (D. Utah 2013). 
19. Bishop v. United States, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1252, 1258 (N.D. Okla. 2014). 
20. De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 666 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 
F. Supp. 2d 456, 483-84 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
21. See DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757, 775 (E.D. Mich. 2014). 
22. See Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1060 (D. Idaho 2014); Geiger v. Kitzhaber, 
994 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (D. Or. 2014); Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 415 
(M.D. Pa. 2014). A magistrate judge ruled in the Idaho case. 
23. Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 1150 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Wolf v. Walker, 986 
F. Supp. 2d 982, 987 (W.D. Wis. 2014). 
24. See Burns v. Hickenlooper, 2014 WL 3634834, at *5 (D. Colo. July 23, 2014); 
Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 544 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
25. See Brenner v. Scott, 999 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1293 (N.D. Fla. 2014). 
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rists ruled the states' proscriptions unconstitutional. 26 In Novem-
ber, Arkansas, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, and 
South Carolina judges held bans invalid.27 During January 2015, 
Alabama and South Dakota jurists struck down limitations, and 
in March, a Nebraska judge invalidated a ban. 28 A number of the-
se decisions remain on appeal. For example, the Fifth Circuit 
heard oral arguments in the Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas 
appeals on January 9,29 Alabama and Florida appealed to the 
Eleventh Circuit,30 and Idaho and Alaska sought en bane review 
from the Ninth Circuit. 31 
District judges in a few jurisdictions have partially invalidated 
bans, essentially requiring the states to recognize same-sex mar-
riages valid in states where they occurred. The Indiana and Ken-
tucky jurists broadened their earlier partial, into complete, inval-
26. See Hamby v. Parnell, No. 3:14--cv-00089-TMB, 2014 WL 5089399, at *1 (D. 
Alaska Oct. 12, 2014); Majors v. Horne, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1313, 1315 (D. Ariz. 2014); General 
Synod of the United Church of Christ v. Resinger, 12 F. Supp. 3d 790, 791 (W.D.N.C. 
2014); Fisher-Borne v. Smith, 14 F. Supp. 3d 695, 698 (M.D.N.C. 2014); Guzzo v. Mead, 
No. 14-CV-200-SWS, 2014 WL 5317797, at *8 (D. Wyo. Oct. 17, 2014). 
27. See Jernigan v. Crane, No. 4:13--cv-00410, 2014 WL 6685391, at *24 (E.D. Ark. 
Nov. 25, 2014); Marie v. Moser, No. 14--cv-02518-DDC/TJJ, 2014 WL 5598128, at *1 (D. 
Kan. Nov. 4, 2014); Campaign for S. Equal. v. Bryant, No. 3:14-CV-818-CWR-LRA, 2014 
WL 6680570, at *2 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 25, 2014); Lawson v. Kelly, No. 14-0622-CV-W-ODS, 
2014 WL 5810215, at *8 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 7, 2014); Rolando v. Fox, 23 F. Supp. 3d 1227, 
1235 (D. Mont. 2014); Condon v. Haley, 21 F. Supp. 3d 572, 576 (D.S.C. 2014). 
28. See Searcy v. Strange, No. 14-0208-CG-N, 2015 WL 328728, at *5 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 
23, 2015); Waters v. Ricketts, No. 8:14CV356, 2015 WL 852603, at *16 (D. Neb. Mar. 2, 
2015); Rosenbrahn v. Daugaard, No. 4:14-CV-04081-KES, 2015 WL 144567, at *11 
(D.S.D. Jan. 12, 2015). 
29. Lauren McGaughy, Social Issues; Appeals Court Hearing Buoys Same-Sex Mar-
riage Advocates, Rous. CHRON., Jan. 10, 2015, at Al; Andy Grimm, Appeals Judges Ash 
More Questions from Gay Marriage Opponents at Hearing on Louisiana's Ban, TIMES· 
PICAYUNE, http://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/01/louisiana_gay_marriage_appea 
ls.html (last updated Jan. 10, 2015, 1:09 AM); see supra notes 12, 18. 
30. Katie Lepri, Florida Begins Appeal of Decision Allowing Same-Sex Marriage, 
MIAMI HERALD (Nov. 15, 2014), http://www.miamiherald.com/news/local/community/gay-
south-florida/article3955145.html; Lyle Denniston, Eleventh Circuit Puts Off Same-Sex 
Marriage Cases, SCOTUSBLOG (Feb. 5, 2015, 7:31 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/ 
02/ eleventh -circuit-puts-off-same-sex -marriage-cases/. 
31. Chris Johnson, Idaho, Alasha Seeh Full Ninth Circuit Review of Marriage Rulings, 
WASH. BLADE (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.washingtonblade.com/2014/10/23/idaho-alaska-
seek-full-ninth-circuit-review-marriage-rulings/; Pamela MacLean, Alasha Loses Round in 
Gay Marriage Appeal, TRIAL INSIDER (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.trialinsider.com/?p= 
5321; Larger 9th Circuit Panel Won't Rehear Idaho Gay Marriage Case, IDAHO STATESMAN 
(Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.idahostatesman.com/2015/01/09/3582910/larger-9th-circuit-pan 
el-wont.html. 
--
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idations.32 A few Ohio and Tennessee district judges partially 
struck down the states' bans.33 
Many district jurists have relied on similar reasoning, with a 
number citing earlier cases in other districts. They found that the 
bans violate the Fourteenth Amendment, more specifically its 
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause.31 The judges were less 
uniform when deciding the level of scrutiny that should apply. 
Most employed various forms of heightened scrutiny, a few explic-
itly adopted strict scrutiny and some used the rational basis 
test. 35 
On October 6, 2014, the Justices denied seven petitions forcer-
tiorari seeking review of the Fourth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuit 
decisions. 36 This rejection governed similar prohibitions in other 
states of those circuits where the districts had not invalidated the 
bans. The Supreme Court's denial led government officials from 
Arizona, Colorado, Montana, Nevada, West Virginia, and Wyo-
ming to permit marriages, even as their counterparts in Alaska, 
Kansas, North Carolina, and South Carolina persisted in defend-
ing these jurisdictions' restrictions. 37 Challenges have been filed 
32. Baskin v. Bogan, 983 F. Supp. 2d 1021, 1029 (S.D. Ind. 2014); Love v. Beshear, 
989 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (W.D. Ky. 2014). 
33. See ALLIANCE FOR ,JUSTICE, supra note 14; Amanda Holpuch, Gay Marriage ls Le-
gal in 32 States-But What About the Other 18?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www. 
the guardian.com/us-news/2014/oct/27 /gay -marriage-legal -us-states. 
34. The Fourth and Tenth Circuits used due process. The Seventh and Ninth used 
equal protection. See supra note 13. 
35. The Seventh and Ninth Circuits used heightened scrutiny, and many judges found 
no rational basis for the bans. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 655-56 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied sub. nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-277); Latta v. 
Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 464-65 (9th Cir. 2014); see also Baskin v. Bogan, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1144, 
1163 (S.D. Ind. 2014) (concluding that the Indiana "law fail[ed] rational basis review"). 
36. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Schaefer v. 
Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648 (7th 
Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Bogan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 
14-277); Walker v. Wolf, 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S. 
Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-278); Bishop v. Smith, 760 F.3d 1070 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied 
sub. nom. Smith v. Bishop, 135 S. Ct. 271 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-136); Kitchen v. Her-
bert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 
265 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-124). The Supreme Court also separately denied certiorari 
to the consolidated cases in Bostic v. Schaefer. McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 314 (U.S. Oct. 
6, 2014) (No. 14-251); Rainey v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 286 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-153); see 
Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Delivers Tacit Win to Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 
2014, at Al. 
37. See ALLIANCE FOR JUSTICE, supra note 14; Holpuch, supra note 33. 
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with district courts in Georgia and North Dakota, but they are 
pending resolution.38 
In short, the overwhelming majority of circuit and district court 
judges across the nation, who resolved the question of whether 
same-sex marriage bans violated the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process or Equal Protection Clause, determined that the pro-
scriptions were unconstitutional. A number of these jurists con-
comitantly applied some form of elevated scrutiny. The next sec-
tion of this article evaluates the Virginia litigation by first 
analyzing Judge Wright Allen's district court treatment, which 
struck down Virginia's marriage laws, and then scrutinizing the 
Fourth Circuit opinion, which affirmed her decision. 
II. THE VIRGINIA LITIGATION 
In July 2013, plaintiffs challenged the Virginia prohibitions 
and the case was assigned to Judge Wright Allen.39 She conducted 
preliminary hearings, set a briefing schedule, and held oral ar-
guments on the legal issues that the challenge raised.40 On Feb-
ruary 14, the jurist issued a twenty-four-page opinion that invali-
dated the proscriptions and enjoined their application, but issued 
a stay pending the appeal's resolution. 41 
A. The Eastern District Opinion 
1. Introduction 
Judge Wright Allen commenced her opinion by invoking Loving 
v. Virginia, which sounded a theme particularly resonant for the 
Commonwealth. She began with a quotation from Mildred Lov-
mg: 
I believe all Americans, no matter their race, no matter their sex, no 
matter their sexual orientation, should have that same freedom to 
38. See supra note 34; Chris Johnson, Court Halts Same-Sex Marriage Lawsuits in 
North Dalwta, WASH. BLADE (Jan. 20, 2015), available at www.washingtonblade.com/2015 
101120/court-halts-sex -marriage-lawsuits-north -dakota/. 
39. Court Docket for Bostic v. McDonnell, No. 2:13-cv-00395AWA-LRL (E.D. Va. ,July 
18, 2013). 
40. Id. 
41. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 484 (E.D. Va. 2014). 
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marry. Government has no business imposing some people's reli-
gious beliefs over others .... I support the freedom to marry for all. 
That's what Loving, and loving are all about.
42 
• 
The jurist observed that a spirited, controversial debate about 
who enjoys the right to marry in America was underway. 13 She 
found that the United States had pursued a difficult and some-
times "painful and poignant" journey to make and keep its citi-
zens free, while the ultimate exercise of freedom is choice. 41 The 
judge stated that one of the courts' noblest endeavors is scrutiniz-
ing laws, which are "rooted in unlawful prejudice."15 Judge Wright 
Allen stated the plaintiffs' claim that Virginia's proscriptions "on 
their freedom to choose to marry the person they love infringes on 
the rights to due process and equal protection."46 She applied 
heightened scrutiny and determined that Virginia's laws banning 
same-sex marriages violated both the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses in the Fourteenth Amendment. 47 
2. Preliminary Issues 
In July 2013, plaintiffs filed their complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983 against the former Governor and Attorney General of Vir-
ginia, as well as the Clerk of the Norfolk Circuit Court, seeking 
declaratory and injunctive relief and a finding that Virginia's 
marriage laws violate due process and equal protection. 18 The ju-
rist recounted that the General Assembly revised the Virginia 
Code in 1997 to prohibit "marriage between persons of the same 
sex" and render every same-sex marriage entered into elsewhere 
"void in all respects in Virginia."19 During 2004, after successful 
challenges to same-sex marriage prohibitions in other states, the 
Assembly proposed a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex 
42. Id. at 460 (citing Mildred Loving, Loving for All, Public Statement on the 40th 
Anniversary of Loving v. Virginia (June 12, 2007)). I use the terms Virginia and Com-




46. Id. at 461. 
47. Id. at 473, 484. 
48. Id. at 461. The primary focus here is VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A, the ban voters ap-
proved in 2006. See id. at 461 n.2. 
49. Id. at 464 (citing VA. CODE ANN.§ 20-45.2 (2008)). 
l 
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marriage, which the voters ratified in 2006.50 In late January, de-
fenda~t Janet Rainey, the State Registrar of Vital Records, to-
gether with the Attorney General, tendered a change in position, 
relinquishing her previous defense of the laws.51 
3. Standard of Review 
Judge Wright Allen next considered Federal Rule of Civil Pro-
cedure 56's articulation that "summary judgment is proper 'if the 
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material 
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law,'" 
as defined and elaborated by two major 1986 Supreme Court 
opinions. 52 She then observed that a plaintiff who seeks a "prelim-
inary injunction must establish a likelihood of success on the 
merits, that the plaintiff is likely to suffer irreparable harm in 
the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips 
in the plaintiff's favor, and that an injunction is in the public in-
terest."53 
4. Analysis 
a. Preliminary Challenges 
The jurist considered the assertion that the plaintiffs lacked 
standing by evaluating the requirements of injury in fact, causal 
connection, and redressability while easily concluding that plain-
tiff met the strictures.51 Judge Wright Allen next examined the 
defendants' claim that the Supreme Court's summary disposition, 
"for want of a substantial federal question," in the 1972 case of 
Baker v. Nelson precluded her exercise of jurisdiction.55 She, as 
50. Id. at 464-65. It also passed the Affirmation of Marriage Act, which proscribed 
civil unions, partnerships and other arrangements between same-sex couples and voided 
in Virginia those arrangements made in other states. Id. at 465 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 
20-45.3 (2008)). 
51. Id. at 461-62 ("Intervenor-Defendant was granted leave to adopt Ms. Rainey's pri-
or motion and briefs in support of that motion."). 
52. Id. at 465-466 (quoting FED. R. Crv. P. 56(a)); see Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 247-50 (1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 
574, 586-87 (1986)). 
53. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 466 (E.D. Va. 2014) (citation omitted). 
54. Id. at 466-68. 
55. Id. at 468-70 (citing Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810, 810 (1972)). 
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many other judges deciding marriage equality lawsuits, conclud-
ed that "doctrinal developments since 1971 compell[ed] the con-
clusion that Baker is no longer binding."56 
b. Constitutional Challenges 
i. Due Process Clause 
The judge initially observed that "all fundamental rights com-
prised within the term liberty are protected by the Federal Con-
stitution from invasion by the States."57 She declared "there can 
be no serious doubt that in America the right to marry is a rigor-
ously protected fundamental right[, as the Court] has recognized 
repeatedly that marriage is a fundamental right protected by 
both the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses."58 The jurist 
elaborated that the "right to marry is inseparable from our rights 
to privacy and intimate association," reciting the paean to "mar-
riage's noble purposes" in the landmark Supreme Court Griswold 
v. Connecticut opinion.59 She then considered, and summarily re-
jected, the assertion that plaintiffs sought to "create and exercise 
a new[] right" because the couples were asking for the same right 
which heterosexuals enjoy: making a "'public commitment to form 
an exclusive relationship and create a family with a partner with 
whom the person shares an intimate and sustaining emotional 
bond."'G0 Virginia's marriage laws "interject profound government 
interference into one of the most personal" sacred choices persons 
make; the nature of the "interference compels careful judicial ex-
amination" to ensure the choices are "free from unwarranted gov-
ernment interference."61 
56. Id. at 469. She invoked the Second Circuit's Windsor opinion and the Utah dis· 
trict's Kitchen v. Herbert case. Id. at 469-70; see supra notes 12, 18, 23, 25, 28 and accom-
panying text; see also infra notes 102-04 and accompanying text. 
57. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 470 (E.D. Va. 2014) (citation omitted). 
58. Id. at 470-71. She cited many classic cases, such as Loving. See id. at 471. 
59. Id. at 471 (citing Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965)). 
60. Id. at 472 (quoting Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1202-03 (D. Utah 
2013)); see also id. ("This right is deeply rooted in the nation's history and implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty because it protects an individual's ability to make deeply per-
sonal choices about love and family free from government interference.") (quoting Kitchen, 
961 F. Supp. 2d at 1203). 
61. Id. at 472-73 (citations omitted). 
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The jurist found that state regulations are generally presumed 
valid and upheld when "rationally related to a legitimate state in-
terest," but that closer scrutiny applies to '"those fundamental 
rights and liberties which are, objectively, deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition, and implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
they were sacrificed."'62 Employing strict scrutiny, she observed 
that "regulations pass constitutional muster only if they are nar-
rowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest."63 Because 
Judge Wright Allen deemed marriage a fundamental right, she 
proceeded to assess the major justifications offered for Virginia's 
laws to ascertain whether they were compelling and closely tai-
lored.61 
The judge first analyzed traditions and the claim of the laws' 
advocates that the prohibitions discourage people from abusing 
marriage rights by marrying to qualify for benefits and concluded 
it lacked "any rational basis."65 She found this interest was not 
advanced by excluding a segment of people from marriage based 
on sexual orientation.613 ,Judge Wright Allen then said that court 
evaluation must stress the laws' history, which prompted the "in-
escapable conclusion" that the state's interest was to "avoid 'radi-
cal changes' that would [diminish a] long-held view" of marriage, 
but "the Supreme Court has rejected the assertion that a prevail-
ing moral conviction can, alone, justify upholding a constitution-
ally infirm law."67 She announced that practically identical con-
cerns were considered and resolved by the Court in Loving, which 
invalidated Virginia's interracial marriage ban despite its pro-
tracted existence.68 The jurist stated that tradition is revered in 
Virginia, but it could not support "denying same-sex couples the 
right to marry any more than it could justify Virginia's ban on in-
terracial marriage."69 
62. Id. at 473 (quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997)). 
63. Id. (citations omitted). 
64. See id. at 473-80 (citations omitted). 
65. Id. at 474. A legal concept's ancient lineage does not immunize it "from attack for 
lacking a rational basis." Id. (citation omitted). 
66. Id. 
67. Id. at 474-75 (citation omitted). 
68. Id. at 475 (citation omitted). 
69. Id. 
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Judge Wright Allen explored the second ·interest, federalism, 
which proponents asserted. The jurist invoked Windsor's pro-
tracted exposition on federal government deference to state law 
policymaking that implicates domestic relations while declaring 
she was mindful that federal intervention was best exercised 
rarely and domestic relations powers appropriately rest with 
states and localities. 70 However, she proclaimed that federal 
courts have properly intervened when state regulations infringed 
the fundamental right to marry and Windsor's "citation to Loving 
is a disclaimer of enormous proportion" because it signaled that 
"due process and equal protection guarantees must trump objec-
tions to federal intervention."71 The jurist observed that Windsor 
invoked the Constitution to protect gay and lesbian citizens' indi-
vidual rights, and the propriety of applying that protection re-
mained compelling when assessing state laws' constitutionality.72 
Judge Wright Allen found meritless the proponents' related 
claim that the judiciary must suspend intervention in deference 
to possible action by the General Assembly or the people because 
the contention ignored the continuing injury Virginia gay and 
lesbian citizens suffered and the "stigma, humiliation and preju-
dice that would be visited upon" their children while awaiting 
change.n The judge declared that courts must act "when core civil 
rights are at stake" and "[i]ntervention under the circumstances 
presented ... is warranted, and compelled."11 
She next addressed the proponents' third rationale, "for-the-
children," which suggested that "responsible procreation and 'op-
timal child rearing' are legitimate interests that support" the ban; 
however, this rationale failed the strict scrutiny and rational ha-
70. Id. at 475-76 (citation omitted). 
71. Id. at 476 (citation omitted). 
72. Id. She, like the Utah district judge, invoked Justice Scalia's Windsor dissent. See 
id.; Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181, 1194 (D. Utah 2013) (citing Justice Scalia's 
dissent in Windsor); see also United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2709 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) ("As I have said, the real rationale of [the Windsor opinion] is that DOMA is 
motivated by bare ... desire to harm couples in same-sex marriages. How easy it is, in-
deed how inevitable, to reach the same conclusion with regard to state laws denying same-
sex couples marital status."). 
73. Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 476-77 (E.D. Va. 2014). She noted the 
lengthy, cumbersome revision process. Id. at 4 77 n.11. 
74. Id. at 477. Despite the wisdom in usually deferring to states on domestic relations, 
"judicial vigilance is a steady beacon searching for an ever-more perfect justice and truer 
freedoms for our country's citizens." Id. (citation omitted). 
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sis tests. 75 Preventing same-sex marriages does not further this 
interest, as the ban needlessly deprives thousands of children 
whom same-sex couples rear of "the protection, the stability, the 
recognition and the legitimacy that marriage conveys."76 The ju-
rist found that research clearly demonstrated "gay and lesbian 
couples are as capable as other couples of raising well-adjusted 
children."77 Moreover, this rationale could not justify the ban, as 
recognition of all gay and lesbian persons' "fundamental right to 
marry can in no way influence whether other individuals will 
marry, or how other individuals will raise families."78 The conten-
tion also failed because it would jeopardize the legitimacy of peo-
ple who do not procreate.79 Judge Wright Allen determined as 
well that the rationale was premised "upon an unconstitutional, 
hurtful and unfounded presumption that same-sex couples cannot 
be good parents."8° Finally, she observed this assertion "miscon-
strues the dignity and values inherent in the fundamental right 
to marry as primarily a vehicle for 'responsibly' breeding 'natural' 
offspring" by ignoring the "profound non-procreative elements of 
marriage."81 In summarizing, Judge Wright Allen believed that 
"[t]he state's compelling interests in protecting and supporting 
our children are not furthered by a prohibition against same-sex 
marriage," which denies marriage's benefits, dignity, and value 
simply because of a person's gender.82 
ii. Equal Protection 
The judge found that the marriage laws violated equal protec-
tion for the same reasons they contravened due process-the pro-
hibitions "significantly interfere with a fundamental right, and 
are inadequately tailored to effectuate only'' sufficiently im-
portant state interests.83 Even absent a determination that a fun-
75. Id. at 477-78. 
76. Id. at 478. 
77. Id. (citation omitted). 
78. Id. (citation omitted). 
79. Id. at 478-79 (citation omitted). 
80. Id. at 479. "Attempting to legislate a state-sanctioned preference for one model of 
parenting ... is constitutionally infirm." Id. 
81. Id. These included "expressions of emotional support and public commitment," 
"spiritual significance," and "expression of personal dedication." Id. (citations omitted). 
82. Id. at 480. 
83. Id. 
·---·-----·,-------~------
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damental right was implicated, she declared they violated equal 
protection because the laws treated differently persons "standing 
in the same relation to" them. 81 
Judge Wright Allen then examined the scrutiny that ought to 
apply and found deference unwarranted, as she detected "reason-
able grounds to suspect 'prejudice against discrete and insular 
minorities ... which tends seriously to curtail the operation of 
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities."'85 The jurist cited Lawrence for the proposition that 
"powerful voices [have condemned] homosexual conduct as im-
moral" for centuries, moral condemnation she found, "continues 
to manifest in Virginia in state-sanctioned activities."86 Judge 
Wright Allen canvassed the levels of scrutiny and concomitant 
tests, ascertaining that ''Virginia's Marriage Laws fail to display 
a rational relationship to a legitimate purpose, and [thus are] 
constitutionally infirm under even the least onerous level of scru-
tiny."87 The judge admonished that she had "considered carefully'' 
and fully evaluated the purposes that advocates proffered but 
found no rational link to the laws challenged. 88 The measures' 
goal and result was "to deprive Virginia's gay and lesbian citizens 
of the opportunity and right to choose to celebrate, in marriage, a 
loving, rewarding monogamous relationship with a partner to 
whom they are committed for life."m1 
iii. Conclusion 
The judge maintained that ''Virginia's laws [ensure] that mar-. 
riage provides profound legal, financial, and social benefits, and 
exacts serious legal, financial, and social obligations."90 However, 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 481 (quoting United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 
(1938)). 
86. Id. She invoked two recent examples. Id. (citation omitted). 
87. Id. at 482. 'I'hus, she "need[ed] not address Plaintiffs' compelling arguments that 
the Laws should be subjected to heightened scrutiny," but would have been "inclined to so 
find." Id. at 481-82 & n.16. 
88. Id. at 482. 
89. Id. "These results occur without furthering any legitimate state purpose." Id. She 
found plaintiffs' "Section 1983 claims are well-taken" because she had invalidated the 
marriage laws and there was adequate state action to grant relief under the Due Process 
and Equal Protection Clauses. Id. at 482-83. 
90. Id. at 483. 
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state involvement in defining and attaching benefits to marriage 
"must withstand constitutional scrutiny, [while] laws that fail 
that scrutiny must fall despite the depth and legitimacy of the 
laws' religious heritage."91 She was "compelled to conclude that 
Virginia's marriage laws unconstitutionally deny Virginia's gay 
and lesbian citizens the fundamental freedom to choose to mar-
ry," because the state's proffered interests must yield to America's 
"cherished protections that ensure the exercise of the private 
choices of the individual citizen regarding love and family."92 
The jurist deemed this resolution consistent with the country's 
traditions of freedom, while its checkered "but dogged journey to-
ward [citizens'] truer and more meaningful freedoms" has contin-
ually brought the United States "to [a] deeper understanding of 
the Constitution's initial three words: we the people."93 She de-
clared that "Li]ustice has often been forged from fires of indigni-
ties and prejudices suffered," and that the nation's triumphs that 
"celebrate the freedom of choice are hallowed."91 The judge pro-
claimed, "We have arrived upon another moment in history when 
We the People becomes more inclusive and our freedom more per-
fect."95 She invoked Abraham Lincoln's 1860 statement regarding 
fairness, concluding that the men, women, and children "whose 
voices join in noble harmony with Plaintiffs today, also ask for 
fairness, and fairness only. This, so far as it is in this Court's 
power, they and all others shall have."96 
iv. Order 
Judge Wright Allen found unconstitutional the marriage pro-
hibitions "and any other Virginia law that bars same-sex mar-
riage or prohibits Virginia's recognition of lawful same-sex mar-
riages from other jurisdictions" as violations of due process and 
equal protection.97 She granted the plaintiffs' summary judgment 
motion and enjoined the proscriptions, but stayed the injunction's 
91. Id. (citation omitted). 
92. Id. 
93. Id. "'We the People' have become a broader, more diverse family than once imag-
ined." Id. (citation omitted). 
94. Id. at 483-84. 
95. Id. at 484. 
96. Id. at 484 & n.20 (citation omitted). 
97. Id. at 484. 
--------------~------- -- -------------------
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execution in light of the High Court's decisior). to grant a stay in 
the Utah marriage equality case styled Kitchen v. Herbert. 98 
B. The Fourth Circuit Majority Opinion 
The defendants and the Attorney General of Virginia swiftly 
filed appeals with the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit, which granted their requests for expedited re-
view .99 The Fourth Circuit panel, which comprised Judges Nie-
meyer, Gregory, and Floyd, conducted a May 13 oral argument 
that involved numerous spirited exchanges. 100 On July 28, the 
court issued the opinion, which Judge Floyd authored for himself 
and Judge Gregory, that affirmed the district court ruling, be-
cause Virginia's laws "impermissibly infringe on its citizens' fun-
damental right to marry," while Judge Niemeyer dissented. 101 
1. Standing 
The majority initially addressed whether the plaintiffs had 
standing to pursue relief. Judge Floyd determined that the plain-
tiffs must "allege (1) an injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the 
defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and that is (3) likely to be 
redressed by the requested relief."102 He found that denial of a 
marriage license to the named plaintiff and his partner easily met 
the standing requirements. w:i 
98. Id.; see Herbert v. Kitchen, 134 S. Ct. 893 (2014) (granting stay); Herbert v. Kitch-
en, 961 F. Supp. 2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013); supra notes 12, 18, 23, 25, 28 and accompanying 
text. 
99. Markus Schmidt, In Procedural Step, Va. Appeals Marriage Case, HlCII. 'l'IMES-
DISPATCH (Feb. 24, 2014), http:l/www.richmond.com/news/virginia/article_af81dd88-9da4-
lle3-86ef-0017a43b2370.html. 
100. Robert Barnes, Judges Divided On Va. Gay-Marriage Ban, WASII. POST, May 14, 
2014, at A4; Adam Serwer, Divided Panel Hears Virginia Case for-and Against-Gay 
Marriage, MSNBC (May 13, 2014, 3:33 PM), http:l/www.msnbc.com/msnbc/gay-marriage-
virginia. federal-court-ban. 
101. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 367 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. 
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225). 
102. Id. at 370 (citation omitted). 
103. Id. at 371. That sufficed for standing, but he also found a second couple met the 
strictures by showing tangible denial of benefits and stigmatic injuries traceable to the 
laws' enforcement, which a declaration of unconstitutionally would redress. !cl. at 372. 
y--~------------------------------. ----- -------------
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2. Merits 
a. Baker v. Nelson 
Judge Floyd treated the Supreme Court's 1972 summary dispo-
sition in Baker v. Nelson 101 similarly to virtually all of the other 
judges, including Judge Wright Allen, who have addressed the 
1972 opinion. The author, like the district jurist, relied on the Se-
cond Circuit Windsor opinion and the myriad other recent lower 
court decisions.rn' He remarked that the "Supreme Court's will-
ingness to decide Windsor without mentioning Baker speaks vol-
umes regarding whether Baker remains good law[, while] devel-
opment of its due process and equal protection jurisprudence in 
the four decades following Baker is even more instructive."
106 Af-
ter carefully scrutinizing that jurisprudence, the majority de-
clined to find Baker "binding precedent," given the Justices' seem-
ing abandonment of that case and the important doctrinal 
developments subsequent to Baker. 101 
b. Fourteenth Amendment 
Judge Floyd initially stated that evaluation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment claims includes two constituents. First, the court 
must ascertain the precise level of constitutional scrutiny that 
applies: "either rational basis review or some [type] of elevated 
scrutiny, such as strict scrutiny."108 Second, the panel applies the 
proper level to decide whether the Virginia marriage laws are 
constitutional. 109 
1. Level of Scrutiny 
Judge Floyd declared that government interference with a fun-
damental right merits strict scrutiny under the Due Process and 
104. 409 U.S. 810 (1972). 
105. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 373-74, 376, 469 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. 
nom. Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); see supra text ac-
companying note 56. 
106. Id. at 37 4. 
107. Id. at :374-75. 
108. Id. at 375 
109. Id. 
--- - ---- - - ·- ---~~- ·-·-------.-----~-----------
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Equal Protection Clauses. 110 The jurist analyzed whether Virgin-
ia's marriage laws infringed on a fundamental right, which de-
rives "from the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of individual 
liberty" that "includes the fundamental right to marry." 111 The 
marriage laws' proponents relied on Washington v. Glucksberg to 
argue that the district court erred by not carefully describing the 
alleged fundamental liberty interest. 112 However, the majority 
found that "Glucksberg's analysis applies only when courts con-
sider whether to recognize new fundamental rights," so it was in-
applicable because the two judges concluded that the "fundamen-
tal right to marry encompasses the right to same-sex marriage."113 
Judge Floyd maintained that over time the Justices had "demon-
strated that the right to marry is an expansive liberty interest 
that may stretch to accommodate changing societal norms[, 
p]erhaps most notably, in Loving, [which] invalidated a Virginia 
law that prohibited white individuals from marrying individuals 
of other races."114 
The panel found that Loving and related marriage cases "speak 
of a broad right to marry," which reflects the Justices' conclusion 
that the right "is a matter of 'freedom of choice' ... that resides 
with the individual."115 When the proponents remarked those cas-
es involved opposite-sex couples, so the Court might not grant 
same-sex couples the same level of constitutional protection, 
Judge Floyd urged that Lawrence and Windsor indicate that the 
choices same-sex couples make enjoy identical constitutional pro-
tections as opposite-sex couples and, thus, refused to describe the 
"right at issue in this case as the right to same sex-marriage."116 
In conclusion, he admonished that "[s]trict scrutiny applies on-
ly when laws 'significantly interfere with a fundamental right."'117 
However, the "Virginia Marriage Laws unquestionably satisfy 
110. Id. (citation omitted). 
111. Id. (citation omitted). 
112. Id. at 376. 
113. Id. 
114. Id. (citation omitted). 
115. Id. at 376-77 (citation omitted). The court also referenced Turner v. Safley, 482 
U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987), and Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 390-91 (1978), in reaching 
the conclusion that a fundamental right to marry exists. 
116. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 377 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. 
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225). 
117. Id. (citation omitted). 
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this requirement: they impede the right to marry by preventing 
same-sex couples from marrying and nullifying the legal import 
of their out-of-state marriages," so strict scrutiny applied. 118 
ii. Application 
When a court applies strict scrutiny, laws "may be justified on-
ly by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to 
express only those interests."119 Proponents assume the burden of 
demonstrating the challenged laws meet this standard, while 
"they must rely on the laws' 'actual purpose[s]' rather than hypo-
thetical justifications." 120 The proponents offered five allegedly 
compelling interests to support the laws that the majority evalu-
ated. 
(1) Federalism 
The panel invoked Windsor for the idea that throughout U.S. 
"history, states have enjoyed the freedom to define and regulate 
marriage as they see fit,'' while proponents cited Windsor in urg-
ing the court "to view Virginia's federalism-based interest in de-
fining marriage as a suitable justification for the Virginia Mar-
riage Laws."121 However, Judge Floyd claimed Windsor 
undermined this position because the Court declared that "[s]tate 
laws defining and regulating marriage, of course, must respect 
the constitutional rights of persons."122 He contended that Wind-
sor "reiterates Loving's admonition that the states must exercise 
their authority without trampling constitutional guarantees[, so] 
Virginia's federalism-based interest in defining marriage ... can-
not justify its encroachment on the fundamental right to mar-
ry ."12a 
Judge Floyd asserted the Supreme Court's recent Schuette v. 
Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action opinion did not alter the 
118. Id. 
119. Id. (citation omitted). 
120. Id. (citation omitted). 
121. Id. at 378. 
122. Id. at 378-79 (quoting United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. _, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 
2691 (2013) (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967))). 
123. Id. at 379. 
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conclusion dictated by Windsor. 121 Because the Schuette majority 
emphasized the "need to respect the voters' policy choice" when 
amending the state constitution, 125 which the Justices did not 
closely scrutinize, the proponents urged its application to Virgin-
ia's voter-approved revision. 126 However, the Fourth Circuit stated 
that "the people's will is not an independent compelling interest 
that warrants depriving same-sex couples of their fundamental 
right to marry."121 Thus, the majority concluded "neither Virgin-
ia's federalism-based interest in defining marriage nor our re-
spect for the democratic process that codified that definition can 
excuse the Virginia Marriage Laws' infringement of the right to 
1''8 marry." -
(2) History and Tradition 
Judge Floyd summarily rejected history and tradition "as a 
compelling interest" to sustain the marriage laws. 129 First, he de-
clared that the Justices had clearly stated that the "ancient line-
age of a legal concept does not give it immunity from attack," 
even under rational basis review, 130 while Lawrence made similar-
ly infirm the closely related notion of promoting moral princi-
ples.131 "Preserving the historical and traditional status quo [was 
thus] not a compelling interest that justifies the Virginia Mar-
riage Laws."132 
(3) Safeguarding the Institution of Marriage 
The proponents argued that deviation from the "tradition of 
opposite-sex marriage [would] destabilize the institution of mar-
riage" by severing the connection between marriage and procrea-





128. Id. at 379-80. 
129. Id. at 380. 
130. Id. (citation omitted). 
131. Id. (citations omitted). 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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· the theories proffered "through rose-colored glasses," they were 
"unfounded for two key reasons."i31 First, the Supreme Court in 
Griswold v. Connecticut rejected the notion that marriage was on-
ly about procreation by upholding "married couples' right not to 
procreate and articulat[ing] a view of marriage that has nothing 
to do with children."i
35 
Second, the proponents mainly based their 
theory on the legacy of no-fault divorce, which the judge described 
as a "wholly unrelated legal change to marriage."136 Although 
Judge Floyd stated this modification certainly altered married 
life's realities "by making it easier for couples to end their rela-
tionships," he saw "no reason to think that legalizing same-sex 
marriage will have a similar destabilizing effect."137 Indeed, the 
majority found it more logical that same-sex couples desire access 
to marriage so they might capitalize on its hallmarks-namely 
faithfulness and permanence-and that permitting "loving, com-
mitted same-sex couples to marry and recognizing their out-of-
state marriages will strengthen the institution of marriage."138 
iv. Responsible Procreation 
The proponents also claimed that the marriage laws, by per-
mitting only opposite-sex marriages, "provide stability [for] the 
kinds of relationships which lead to unplanned pregnancies," thus 
"avoiding or diminishing the negative outcomes frequently asso-
ciated with unintended children."i39 However, the majority found 
that the laws were not properly tailored to advance this interest 
because they were "woefully underinclusive" in that "[s]ame-sex 
couples are not the only category of couples who cannot reproduce 
accidentally."i 10 Judge Floyd analogized the laws' extreme under-
inclusivity to the permit stricture in City of Cleburne v. Clebu~ne 
Living Center, Inc., which the Supreme Court found so under~n­
clusive that it must have been premised on "'an irrational preJU-
134. Id. He recognized in some cases substantial deference was owed to the Assembly's 
predictive judgments. Id. . . . ,· . n 
135. Id. Judge Floyd, like Judge Allen, cited Griswold's classic description. Id. (citatw 
omitted); see supra note 57 and accompanying text. . 
136. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 381 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. 
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dice,' rendering the law unconstitutional" and leading the Bostic 
·majority "to draw the same conclusion."141 ·Judge Floyd deter-
mined the responsible procreation contention also failed because 
strict scrutiny mandated that a "state's means further its compel-
ling interest."142 Therefore, he found that barring "same-sex cou-
ples from marrying and ignoring their out-of-state marriages did 
not serve Virginia's goal of preventing out-of-wedlock births."143 
v. Optimal Childrearing 
The proponents argued that children developed best when 
reared by their married biological parents in a stable family unit 
and emphasized the importance of "gender-differentiated parent-
ing," and hence the laws "safeguard children by preventing same-
sex couples from marrying and starting inferior families."144 The 
majority found "extremely persuasive" the arguments proffered 
by opponents and their amici that "there is no scientific evidence 
that parenting effectiveness is related to parental sexual orienta-
tion ... [and the laws] actually harm the children of same-sex 
couples by stigmatizing their families and robbing them of the 
stability, economic security, and togetherness that marriage fos-
ters."145 
However, the jurist found it unnecessary to resolve this dispute 
because the proponents' contention faltered "for at least two other 
reasons."1rn First, under elevated scrutiny, states cannot sustain 
laws with "'overbroad generalizations about the different talents, 
capacities or preferences of the groups in question."147 Second, 
heightened "scrutiny requires congruity between a law's means 
and its end[, which] is absent here."148 Because each of the propo-
nents' justifications for the laws failed, they could not survive 
. t . 149 stnc scrutmy. 
141. Id. at 382 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 450 (1985)). 
142. Id. 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 383. 
145. Id. (quoting Brief for Am. Psychological Ass'n et al., as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Plaintiffs-Appellees at 23, Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014) (No. 147-1167)). 
146. Id. at 384. 
147. Id. (quoting United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. 
2015] MARRIAGE EQUALITY IN VIRGINIA 1215 
In conclusion, the majority stated that Virginia's prohibitions 
contravened the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses and, 
thus, affirmed the district court's summary judgment grant and 
injunction. 150 Judge Floyd recognized that "same-sex marriage 
makes some people deeply uncomfortable[, but] inertia and ap-
prehension are not legitimate bases for denying same-sex couples 
d d 1 t t . ,,1s1 B h h . " ue process an equa pro ec ion . . . . ecause t e c 01ce to 
marry is an intensely personal decision that alters the course of 
an individual's life[, denying] same-sex couples this choice prohib-
its them from participating fully in our society, which is precisely 
the type of segregation that the Fourteenth Amendment cannot 
countenance."102 
C. The Fourth Circuit Dissenting Opinion 
Dissenting Judge Niemeyer maintained the case was about 
whether a "[s]tate's decision not to recognize same-sex marriage 
violates the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution[, so 
the] judicial response must be limited to an analysis applying es-
tablished constitutional principles."153 He criticized the majority 
for declaring, "ipse dixit, that the 'fundamental right to marry en-
compasses the right to same-sex marriage' and is thus protected 
by" substantive due process because the jurists expressly "by-
passe[ d] the relevant constitutional analysis" which Glucksberg 
requires by stating it is "not necessary because no new fundamen-
tal right is being recognized."151 Judge Niemeyer deemed the 
analysis "fundamentally flawed," as it did not consider that the 
"marriage,'' which the Court has long recognized "as a fundamen-
tal right is distinct from the newly proposed relationship of a 




153. Id. at 385 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting). It was not about whether judges "favor or 
disfavor same-sex marriage" or state choices are "good policy decisions." Id. 
154. Id. at 385-86 (quoting id. at 376 (majority opinion)); see Washington v. Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (establishing a two-step analysis for substantive due 
process claims by determining: (1) whether the right is deeply rooted in tradition and (2) 
articulating an appropriate description of the asserted liberty interest). 
155. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 386 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. 
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225) (Niemeyer, J., dissent-
ing). 
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to ''explain how this new notion became incorporated into the tra-
ditional definition of marriage except by linguistic manipula-
tion."156 The dissent, thus, contended that "the majority never 
asks the question necessary to finding a fundamental right-
whether same-sex marriage is a right that is 'deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition' and 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty, such that neither liberty nor justice would exist if 
[it was] sacrificed."'157 Judge Niemeyer asserted, were the majori-
ty to "recognize and address the distinction between the two rela-
tionships-the traditional one and the new one-as it must, it 
would simply be unable to reach the conclusion that it has 
reached."158 He respectfully found that "Virginia was well within 
its constitutional authority to adhere to its traditional definition 
of marriage .... "159 
The jurist asserted that substantive due process only protected 
fundamental liberty interests, which the Court defined in 
Glucksberg. 160 In ascertaining whether there was a fundamental 
right, he instructed that courts must always carefully describe 
the claimed liberty interest, which must be characterized "in its 
narrowest terms." 161 When judges identify rights as fundamental, 
courts apply strict scrutiny, which "is extremely difficult for a law 
to withstand[, so the Court has admonished that jurists] be ex-
tremely cautious in recognizing fundamental rights because doing 
so ordinarily removes freedom of choice from the hands of the 
16') people." · 
156. Id. He found the failure "even more pronounced by the majority's acknowledge-
ment that same-sex marriage is a new notion that has not been recognized 'for most of our 
country's history."' Id. (citation omitted). 
157. Id. (citing Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721); see supra note 60 and accompanying text. 
158. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 386 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. 
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225) (Niemeyer, J., dissent-
ing). 
159. Id. 
160. Id. at 389; see Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 719-21. 
161. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 389 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. 
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225) (Niemeyer, J., dissent-
ing). But see Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992) (major-
ity opinion) (explicitly rejecting the notion that Fourteenth Amendment liberty involving 
marriage must be viewed narrowly); infra notes 226-30 and accompanying text. 
162. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 389-90 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. 
Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225) (Niemeyer, J., dissent-
ing) (citation omitted). 
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Judge Niemeyer asserted that the plaintiffs and the majority 
"recognize that narrowly defining the asserted liberty interest 
would require them to demonstrate a new fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage, which they cannot do" and, thus did not "ar-
gue that same-sex marriage is, 'objectively, deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition,' and 'implicit in the concept of or-
dered liberty."'16:i He claimed they instead contended that the 
"fundamental right to marriage that has previously been recog-
nized by the Supreme Court is a broad right that should apply to 
the plaintiffs without the need to recognize a new fundamental 
right to same-sex marriage[, arguing] the Supreme Court did not 
narrowly define the right to marriage in" Loving, Turner, or 
Zablocki. 161 The jurist admitted the Supreme Court did not recog-
nize a new fundamental right to fit the facts in the specific cases, 
but was not required to do so, as each "involved a couple asserting 
a right to enter into a traditional marriage."165 Thus, no case that 
plaintiffs cited and on which the majority relied implicated the 
"assertion of a brand new liberty interest."166 He asserted that "to 
now define the previously recognized fundamental right to 'mar-
riage' as a concept that includes the new notion of 'same-sex mar-
riage' amounts to a dictionary jurisprudence, which defines terms 
as convenient to attain an end."167 
Judge Niemeyer acknowledged that "same-sex and opposite-sex 
relationships share many attributes[, but] there are also signifi-
cant distinctions . . . that can justify differential treatment by 
lawmakers."168 Thus, he found when the Court has recognized a 
fundamental right to marry, it has "emphasized the procreative 
and social ordering aspects of traditional marriage."16!) Because he 
found that there were "fundamental differences between tradi-
tional and same-sex marriage, the plaintiffs and the majority err 
by conflating the two relationships under the loosely drawn ru-
bric of 'the right to marriage."'110 To "bridge the obvious differ-
163. Id. at 390 (citation omitted). Niemeyer said they recognized it as a recent devel-
opment. Id. (citation omitted). 
164. Id. (citations omitted). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 390-91. 
167. Id. at 391. 
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ences between" the relationships, the judge claimed that the 
plaintiffs relied heavily on Loving to "argue that the fundamental 
right to marriage 'has always been based on, and defined by, the 
constitutional liberty to select the partner of one's choice.'"111 Judge 
Niemeyer claimed that Loving fails to suggest an "unrestricted 
right to marry whomever one chooses," but simply held that mari-
tal restrictions could not be premised on race. 172 He asserted that 
"[t]o stretch Loving's holding to say that the right to marry is not 
limited by gender and sexual orientation is to ignore the inextri-
cable, biological link between marriage and procreation that the 
Supreme Court has always recognized."173 Thus, the jurist con-
tended the majority and the district court erred by interpreting 
the "Court's marriage cases as establishing a right that includes 
• ,,174 same-sex marriage. 
In short, Judge Niemeyer claimed that the "fundamental right 
to marriage does not include a right to same-sex marriage," and 
"[u]nder the Glucksberg analysis ... there is no new fundamental 
right to same-sex marriage."175 Thus, he stated that Virginia's 
laws must "be upheld if there is any rational basis for the laws."176 
Judge Niemeyer instructed that rational basis review required 
courts to give legislatures "heavy deference" and to simply "de-
termine whether the classification in question is, at a minimum, 
rationally related to legitimate governmental goals." 111 Moreover, 
under this review, statutes bear a "strong presumption of validi-
ty, and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classifica-
tion have the burden 'to negative every conceivable basis which 
might support [them].'"178 He reviewed Virginia's reasons for the 
laws, which included that opposite-sex marriages provide a "fami-
ly structure by which to nourish and raise ... children, ... that a 
171. Id. at 391-92. 
172. Id. at 392 (asserting that Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), appeal 
dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), supported this reading of Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
(1967)). 
173. Id. (citation omitted). 
174. Id. He also claimed the plaintiffs ignored the problem of extending marital rights 
to relationships states now restrict. Id. 
175. Id. at 393. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. (citation omitted). 
178. Id. (citation omitted). 
-''---·----·---.~------------··-·-·-----
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biological family is a more stable environment, and [renouncing] 
any interest in encouraging same-sex marriage[s]."179 
The jurist observed that states could "selectively provide bene-
fits to only certain groups when providing those same benefits to 
other groups would not further the State's ultimate goals."180 He 
proclaimed that recognizing same-sex marriages would not ad-
vance Virginia's "interest in ensuring stable families in the event 
of unplanned pregnancies."181 The judge considered Virginia's ar-
gument that "marriage is a '[c]omplex social institution' with a 
'set of norms, rules, patterns, and expectations that powerful-
ly ... affect ... people's choices, actions, and perspectives'" and 
"that discarding the traditional definition of marriage will have 
far-reaching consequences that cannot .easily be predicted."182 He 
asserted that "legislative choices 'may be based on rational specu-
lation unsupported by evidence or empirical data"' under rational 
basis review and that legislatures were better equipped than 
courts to make these assessments and plot courses of action based 
on predictions. 183 
Judge Niemeyer declared that "Virginia has undoubtedly artic-
ulated sufficient rational bases for its marriage laws, and [he] 
would find that those bases constitutionally justify the laws."181 
Because the judge determined that "Virginia's marriage laws are 
rationally related to its legitimate purposes, they withstand ra-
tional-basis scrutiny under the Due Process Clause."185 
The jurist treated equal protection, as he decided the laws in-
fringed no fundamental right. 186 Judge Niemeyer explained the 
levels of scrutiny but said "when a regulation adversely affects 
members of a class that is not suspect or quasi-suspect, the regu-
lation is 'presumed to be valid and will be sustained if the classi-
fication drawn by the statute is rationally related to a legitimate 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 394. 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 394-95. 
183. Id. at 395 (citation omitted). 
184. Id. They are "grounded on the biological connection of men and women; the poten-
tial for their having children; the family order needed in raising children; and, on a larger 
scale, the political order resulting from stable family units." Id. 
185. Id. 
186. Id. at 398. The majority did not address this, as it found that right. Id. at 374-77 
(majority opinion). 
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state interest."'187 Although the plaintiffs urged that Virginia's 
laws "should be subjected to some level of heightened scrutiny be-
cause they discriminate on the basis of sexual orientation ... nei-
ther the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has ever applied 
heightened scrutiny to a classification based on sexual. orienta-
tion."188 The judge evaluated Romer, Windsor, and a Fourth Cir-
cuit case and found these and the "vast majority of' appellate 
courts had applied rational basis review. 189 Thus, following this 
precedent, he "would hold that Virginia's marriage laws are sub-
ject to rational-basis review ... [and] conclude that there is a ra-
tional basis for the laws."190 
Judge Niemeyer summarized by observing he strongly disa-
greed "with the assertion that same-sex marriage is subject to the 
same constitutional protections as the traditional right to mar-
ry."l!n Because the dissenter ascertained that "there is no funda-
mental right to same-sex marriage and there are rational reasons 
for not recognizing it," he concluded that the federal judiciary 
"must allow the States to enact legislation on the subject in ac-
cordance with their political processes."192 
The Fourth Circuit majority denied the defendants' request for 
a stay. 19:3 However, those parties promptly requested a stay from 
the Supreme Court that granted it, while they and· the Attorney 
General expeditiously filed appeals with the Supreme Court. 191 
The Justices denied all petitions for certiorari in Bostic on Octo-
ber 6, and marriages began in Virginia shortly thereafter. 195 
Governor Terry McAuliffe, Attorney General Mark Herring, 
and numerous additional state and local officials across the 
Commonwealth quickly instituted efforts that would fully imple-
187. Id. at 396 (Niemeyer, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
188. Id. 
189. Id. at 396-97. 
190. Id. at 398. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. He mounted a strong defense of the laws, but the Supreme Court majority will 
probably apply Windsor's reasoning to invalidate state bans. See infra note 217 and ac-
companying text. 
193. Order, Bostic v. Schaefer, No. 14-1167(L) (4th Cir. Aug. 13, 2014) (denying stay). 
194. McQuigg v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 32 (Aug. 20, 2014) (granting stay); see Alan Rappe-
port, Supreme Court Delays Gay Marriage in Virginia, A Day Before It Was Set to Begin, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2014, at Al2. 
195. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
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ment the judicial mandate. For example, Governor McAuliffe 
promulgated an executive order instructing state agencies and 
employees to accord couples in same-sex marriages all of the ben-
efits throughout numerous critical areas, including health care, 
taxation, and adoption, that opposite-sex couples possess. 19'; The 
issuance of marriage licenses by clerk of court offices appeared to 
function rather smoothly because a number made concerted ef-
forts to comply, and the seven months required to complete the 
appeals granted most a lengthy time to prepare and to anticipate 
potential difficulties by initiating efficacious systems. 197 
In sum, Judge Wright Allen concluded that the Virginia mar-
riage laws proscribing same-sex marriage violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment and enjoined their application, and a Fourth Circuit 
panel majority affirmed her determination. With the Supreme 
Court's October 6, 2014 denial of certiorari petitions seeking re-
view of Bostic, 198 marriage equality came to Virginia. The next 
section extracts lessons from the litigation that challenged the 
marriage laws. 
Ill. LESSONS 
Numerous lessons can be derived from the story of how mar-
riage equality arrived in Virginia. Marriage equality's realization 
in the Commonwealth entailed a number of important practical 
and symbolic effects. The most critical pragmatic impact is that 
thousands of same-sex couples and families, especially the chil-
dren whom these couples rear, will now be relieved of "stigma, 
humiliation, and prejudice" and enjoy the many tangible and in-
tangible benefits that marriage affords. HJ\) Tangible advantages 
include economic benefits and security, namely marriage's conse-
196. See Exec. Order No. 30 (Oct. 7, 2014) ; see also Statement of Att'y Gen. Herring on 
Marriage Equality in Va. (Oct. 6, 2014) (detailing the work with local clerks to begin issu-
ing marriage licenses to same-sex couples). 
197. John Woodrow Cox, Same-Sex Couples Quichly and Joyously Wed in Va., WASH. 
POST, Oct. 7, 2014, at BOl; Jim Nolan, McAuliffe Orders Agencies to Comply with Same· 
Sex Marriage, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.richmond.com/news/vir 
ginia/ article_aad 77b 10-8b l 4-5d 14-807b-Ob36344c679 l .html. 
198. See supra note 36. 
199. See Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 658 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Bo-
gan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-277); supra notes 73, 76, 81, 1:18, 
152 and accompanying text. 
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quences for taxation and health care, and adoption of children.200 
The intangible advantages encompass respect, stability, compan-
ionship, legitimacy, emotional and psychological support, and 
• • 201 recogmtion. 
Marriage equali.ty also yielded crucial symbolic effects. Virginia 
has been a defendant in multiple landmark cases involving social 
change over the last six decades. Illustrative were lawsuits that 
sought to dismantle segregation in public facilities, especially 
schools,202 remove impediments restricting voting,203 terminate the 
ban on interracial marriage,204 and permit admission of women to 
Virginia Military Institute.205 The invocation of those and other 
relevant case precedents by Judge Allen and Judge Floyd demon-
strated their appreciation of marriage equality's critical symbolic 
value. 206 
Insofar as marriage equality advocates pursued a national liti-
gation strategy, the evaluation above suggests that Virginia fig-
ured prominently in this endeavor. Because the South and the 
Rocky Mountain West could generally seem less amenable to 
marriage equality than other regions, namely the West Coast and 
the Northeast, equality's champions might have perceived Virgin-
ia as comparatively hospitable to marriage equality. For instance, 
200. Basliin, 766 F.3d at 658. 
201. See id. 
202. Davis v. County School Board, 103 F. Supp. 337 (E.D. Va. 1952), was a Virginia 
companion case to Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See also RICHARD 
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: 'l'HE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK 
AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOH EQUALITY 480-507 (1975) (analyzing the Davis case); Robert B. 
McKay, Segregation and Public Recreation, 40 VA. L. REV. 697, 706-25 (1954) (discussing 
case law surrounding desegregation of public facilities such as golf courses and swimming 
pools). 
203. Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666, 670 (1966); see David Schultz & 
Sarah Clark, Wealth v. Democracy: The Unfulfilled Promise of the Twenty-Fourth Amend-
ment, 29 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 375, 375 (2011). 
204. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 2, 12 (1967); see Akhil Reed Amar, The Warren 
Court and the Constitution (with Special Emphasis on Brown and Loving), 67 SMU L. 
HEV. 671, 683 (2014); Christopher R Leslie, Embracing Loving: Trait-Specific Marriage 
Laws and Heightened Scrutiny, 99 COHNELL L. REV. 1077, 1102 (2014); see also supra 
notes 42, 68, 115, 123 and accompanying text. 
205. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 557-58 (1996); see David S. Cohen & Nan-
cy Levit, Still Unconstitutional: Our Nation's Experiment with State-Sponsored Sex Segre-
gation in Education, 44 SETON HALL L. REV. 339, 348-49 (2014); Rosemary Salomone, 
Rights and Wrongs in the Debate over Single-Sex Schooling, 93 B.U. L. REV. 971, 972 
(2013); see also supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
206. See, e.g., supra notes 68-69, 114, 116, 152 and accompanying text. 
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the Commonwealth is the northernmost Southern jurisdiction, 
·rather centrist politically, a state within the relatively moderate 
Fourth Circuit, and Virginia has been the defendant in much 
pathbreaking litigation over social policy questions. These ideas 
explain why Bostic was one of the first cases pursued and decided 
after the Supreme Court issued its ruling in Windsor, why it has 
been central to the nationwide marriage equality initiative, and 
why Virginia became the first southern jurisdiction in which a 
court recognized marriage equality. 
IV. SUGGESTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
A. Virginia 
Virginia state and local officials, encompassing the governor 
and the attorney general, should keep fully implementing the ju-
dicial mandate, which the Bostic litigation enunciated, by guar-
anteeing that same-sex couples and their families, particularly 
children, receive treatment identical to opposite-sex couples and 
their families by facilitating thorough marriage equality. The ini-
tial endeavors attempting to implement the Bostic opinion have 
proved valuable; however, officers throughout the Commonwealth 
must redouble their efforts to insure that the promise of compre-
hensive marriage equality does become a reality.207 
The General Assembly ought to conduct a thorough review of 
the Virginia Code and revise all strictures that it determines pre-
vent same-sex couples from enjoying full marriage equality,208 but 
numerous legislators have apparently chosen to await final Su-
preme Court disposition.209 The Virginia judiciary should corre-
207. See supra note 196 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 208-09. 
208. State departments and agencies, with assistance from the Attorney General's of-
fice, have apparently conducted thorough reviews of pertinent rules and regulations while 
eliminating or modifying any that limit marriage equality for same-sex couples. See supra 
notes 196-97 and accompanying text. 
209. Jenna Portnoy, Same-Sex Marriage in Virginia Is Legal, but Maneuvering Rages 
on in Richmond, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/vir 
ginia-politics/ same-sex-marriage-is-legal-in-virginia-but-maneuvering-rages-on-in-richmon 
d/2015/01/12/61a3057c-9530-lle4-927a-4fa2638cdlbO_story.html; see Garrett Epps, Mar-
riage Equality Without Equivocation, ATLANTIC (Jan. 29, 2015), http://www.theatlantic. 
com/politics/archive/2015/01/marriage-equality-without-equivocation/384999; Resistance 
Bands, ECONOMIST (Feb. 3, 2015), http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/ 
2015/02/gay-marriage; supra note 15; infra note 212. The ban on same-sex couple adop· 
tions is an obvious example. See VA. CODE ANN.§ 63.2-1232 (2012); Laura Kebede, Lesbian 
1224 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1193 
spondingly be receptive to legal actions that people who are in or 
wish to enter or exit same-sex marriages pursue. For example, 
the Commonwealth's appellate tribunals could generally treat 
LGB'l' persons similarly to heterosexual individuals and couples 
when entertaining divorce and custody litigation.210 
Observers in some jurisdictions, apart from Virginia, have ex-
pressed concern that marriage equality could permit actions that 
infringe upon the religious liberty of marriage equality opponents 
who favor a heterosexual view of marriage. Illustrations encom-
pass judicial officials, staff in clerk of the court offices responsible 
for issuing marriage licenses, bakers, florists, and wedding plan-
ners whom the states might ostensibly force to participate in ac-
tivities, namely same-sex marriages, which violate their religious 
beliefs. 211 Minimal concrete evidence indicates that analogous be-
havior has occurred in Virginia thus far. Should evidence of this 
conduct be adduced, the General Assembly ought to collect, ana-
lyze and synthesize pertinent data and, if the information shows 
that problems exist, consider legislative solutions that promise to 
remedy the difficulties. 212 
Couple Wins Right to Have Names on Children's Birth Certificates, RICH. TIMES-DISPATCH 
(Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/article_tle7 cfa92-72aa-5d l 9-835b-
f8785:3b07a la.html. · 
210. Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenldns, 6:37 S.E.2d 330 (2006), may intimate this. 
211. Richard Fausset & Alan Blinder, States Renew Fight to Stop Gay Marriage, N.Y. 
TIMES, Jan. 29, 2015, at Al; Leonard Pitts, Jr., Ba/wries Now Battleground in Same-Sex 
Marriage Front, DE'l'IWIT FI\EE PRESS (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.freep.com/story/opinion/ 
contributors/2015/0l/29/gay-marriage-cake-wars-sex/22526991/; see Robin Fretwell Wil-
son, Marriage of Necessity: Same-Sex Marriage and Religious Liberty Protection, 64 CASE 
W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1168-69 (2014); supra note 209 and accompanying text. 
212. Wilson, supra note 211; see SAME-SEX MAHIUAGE AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: 
EMERGING CONFLICTS (Douglas Laycock et al. eds., 2008). Lawmakers have introduced 
some bills, but none have passed. See, e.g., S. J. Res. 283 (Va. 2015); H.B. 1414 (Va. 2015); 
sec also Michael Barbaro and Erik Eckholm, Right to Deny Service to Gays Stirs Broad 
Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2015, at Al (explaining the adverse public reaction to the 
passage of an Indiana law that many believe would permit discrimination against homo-
sexuals); Hobert T. Garrett, Texas Lawmahers Pushing Bach Against Gay Rights Success, 
DALLAS MOHNING NEWS (Feb. 4, 2015), http://www.dallasnews.com/news/politics/state-pol 
itics/20150204-texas-lawmakers-pushing-back-against-gay-rights-successes.ece (explain-
ing how gay rights successes have affected the political lawmaking climate in Texas); 
Portnoy, supra note 209 (commenting on the partisan political dynamics and potential leg-
islation as a result of the change in same-sex marriage legality); Markus Schmidt, House 
Panel Scraps Marshall's Bill on Licensees, Gays, HICH. TIMES-DI8PATCII (Jan., 29, 2015), 
http://www.richmond.com/news/virginia/article_lcda4826-:39:36-5f56-a3b3-f2217cl34487. 
html (reporting that a House panel defeated a proposed legislation that "would allow any-
one holding a state license, including business owners, lawyers and doctors, to deny ser-
vices to gay people without facing disciplinary action"); Mark .Joseph Stern, A New Virgin-
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B. United States 
Writers have asserted that the Supreme Court's October 6 de-
cision to reject certiorari petitions in the Fourth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuit appeals indicated the Justices would not review 
lower court decisions until a circuit upheld a same-sex marriage 
ban, as the Sixth Circuit recently did. 21 :i These predictions seemed 
prescient when tho .Justices accepted the Sixth Circuit appeals in 
January. 211 The Fifth Circuit heard arguments on Louisiana, Mis-
sissippi, and Texas appeals in early 2015, but it may not issue an 
opinion quickly enough for the Court to resolve the question dur-
ing the 2014 Term. 215 
The unclear status of marriage equality shows that the Justic-
es properly decided to grant the Sixth Circuit appeals. When the 
appellate court ruled that Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Ten-
nessee bans were constitutional, it prompted a "circuit split," fos-
tering diverse legal regimes in those states and much of the na-
tion's remainder. This patchwork, with marriages invalid for 
certain jurisdictions and legal in others, dramatically affects the 
lives of "real" people. 2 rn Examples are the 300 Michigan and 1300 
Utah same-sex couples who married before higher courts stayed 
district opinions invalidating bans. 217 Rejection of the Fourth, 
Seventh, and Tenth Circuit certiorari petitions analogously 
ia Bill Would Let Schools, Hotels, Restaurants and Hospitals Turn Gays Away, SLA'l'E 
(Jan. 8, 2015, 12:19 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/0l/08/virginia_anti_ 
gay _bill_ would_let_schools_and_hospitals_turn_gays_a way .html (staunchly challenging 
the proposed bill, before it had been scrapped, which would attach a "conscience clause" to 
licenses and certificates obtained from the Commonwealth of Virginia, effectively allowing 
individuals to refuse service on the basis of moral or religious opposition); Laura Vozzella, 
McAuliffe Invites Firms Troubled by Indiana Law, WASH. POS'l', Mar. 31, 2015, at B5 (re-
porting on Virginia Governor Terry McAuliffe's appeal to businesses to relocate to Virginia 
in the wake of backlash over Indiana's religious freedom law). 
213. See, e.g., De13oer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 404, 418 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 
135 S. Ct. 1040 (U.S .• Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-571); Lyle Denniston, Same-Sex Marriage: A 
Simple Appeal, SCO'l'USBLOG (Nov. 17, 2014, 3:04 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/ 
11/same-sex-marriage-a-simple-appeal/; supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
214. See supra notes 15, 36. 
215. See supra note 28. 
216. DeBoer, 772 F.3d at 410 (expressing concern for real people). 
217. Caspar v. Snyder, No. 14-CV-11499, 2015 WL 224741, at *1 (E.D. Mich. 2015); 
Evans v. Utah, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1192, 1197 (D. Utah 2014); see Paul Egan, Appellate Court 
Reverse Conrse, Issues Temporary Stay on Same-Sex Marriages Until Wednesday, DETROIT 
FHEE PRESS (Mar. 22, 2014), http://archive.freep.com/article/20140322/NEWS06/30322 
0063/6th-Circuit-Court-of-Appeals-same-sex-gay-marriage-stay-Schuette. 
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means thousands of same-sex couples who recently married or 
could wed in the future experience "legal limbq."m Thus, the Jus-
tices correctly agreed to hear the Sixth Circuit appeals, because 
many persons need their marital status clarified and protracted 
treatment will keep injuring the same-sex couples and their chil-
dren and prolong uncertainty. 
The Court might resolve the marriage equality issue in a num-
ber of ways. It could apply to state bans reasoning like that the 
Windsor majority employed when invalidating section three of 
DOMA, as Justice Scalia foresaw. 219 No persuasive contention dif-
ferentiates the situations, and Windsor suggested that individual 
rights trump federalism even respecting the marriage definition 
that the states conventionally regulated.220 The Court may also 
invoke Equal Protection Clause analysis, as did the Seventh and 
Ninth Circuits and Judge Wright Allen, by considering bans a 
form of sexual orientation discrimination, which receives elevated 
• 221 scrutmy. 
If a majority finds these paths unconvincing or requiring too 
significant doctrinal modification, it could follow other, putatively 
narrower, avenues. The Justices might deem bans gender dis-
218. See supra note 36 and accompanying text; see also Ginnie Graham, More Than 
3,200 Same-Sex Couples Marry in Oklahoma in Less Than Three Months, TULSA WOHLD 
(Jan. 18, 2015), http://www.tulsaworld.com/news/ginniegraham/more-than-same-sex-coupl 
es-marry-in-oklahoma-in-less/article_dd39267c-093f-5d13-a67 5-734b 1163 76 59 .html. They 
will be in limbo until the Justices decide. Should the Court uphold bans, judges will ap-
parently recognize their marriages. See Caspar, 2015 WL 224741, at *26. 
219. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
220. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. at_,_, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2691-92 (2013); Bos-
tic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 379 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Schaefer v. Bostic, 
135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193, 1228 
(10th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Herbert v. Kitchen, 135 S. Ct. 265 (U.S. Oct. 6, 
2014) (No. 14-124); see Franklin supra note 5 at 871 n.248. It might use heightened scru-
tiny and find that the dignity, economic, and other injuries which bans impose violate the 
Fourteenth Amendment. 
221. Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648, 657-59 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. nom. Bo-
gan v. Baskin, 135 S. Ct. 316 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-277); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456, 
467-68 (9th Cir. 2014); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 480-83 (E.D. Va. 2014). Bos-
tic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375, 384 (4th Cir. 2014) cert. denied sub. nom. Schaefer v. 
Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225), and Kitchen, 755 F.3d at 1208-22, 
partly used the "rights," not the "classification," equal protection strand. The Court may 
conclude bans fail this test, as the responsible procreation and "wait and see" rationales 
are insufficiently important state interests or the heterosexual-only classification has no 
substantial relationship to their attainment. It might even hold that bans lack a rational 
basis. See supra note 10 (Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and 'l'enth Circuit majority opinions). 
But see supra note 10 (Fourth and Tenth Circuit dissents). 
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crimination under equal protection that warrant intermediate re-
view; because they facially classify on the basis of sex and are 
premised on gender stereotypes.222 The Court as well may employ 
a Due Process Clause approach-similar to notions the Fourth 
and Tenth Circuits and Judge Wright Allen used-by recognizing 
same-sex couples' fundamental right to marry, which enjoys strict 
scrutiny.223 The Justices might correspondingly determine that 
bans contravene liberty under due process, as Windsor, Lawrence 
v. Texas, and the Bostic circuit and district court opinions inti-
mated.224 
In the final analysis, multiple routes now lead to marriage 
equality.220 More specifically, in rejecting the states' narrow defi-
nition of the fundamental right to marry-as espoused by Judge 
Niemeyer in his dissent in Bostic226-the Court should rely on its 
decisions in Casey227 and Lawrence,228 which directly rejected the 
"narrowest-historical-context approach" enunciated by footnote 
six of the plurality opinion in Michael H. v. Gerald D.229 There-
222. Latta, 771 F.3d at 485-90 (Berzon, J., concurring); see Suzanne B. Goldberg, Risky 
Arguments in Social Justice Litigation: The Case of Sex Discrimination and Marriage 
Equality, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 2087, 2109-10 (2014); Leslie, supra note 204, at 1089-95. It 
may find bans fail that test, as the rationales tendered are not sufficiently important gov-
ernment interests or the classification lacks a substantial relationship to achieving them. 
223. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375-77, 384 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. denied sub. 
nom. Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); Kitchen, 755 F.3d 
at 1229-30; Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 472-73, 483-84 (E.D. Va. 2014). But see 
supra note 15 (Fourth and Tenth Circuit dissents). It could decide that bans do not sur-
vive, as the reasons proffered are not compelling or the classification lacks narrow tailor-
ing to their realization. 
224. Windsor, 570 U.S. at_, 133 S. Ct. at 2689, 2692-93; Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 
558, 566-67, 578-79 (2003); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 375-77 (4th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied sub. nom. Schaefer v. Bostic, 135 S. Ct. 308 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2014) (No. 14-225); Bostic 
v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 471-73 (E.D. Va. 2014); see Franklin, supra note 5, at 881-
89; Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748-50 (2011). 
225. Many doctrinal tests seem satisfied. David Cruz, Symposium: Unveiling Marriage 
Equality?, SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 17, 2015, 6:13 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/01/ 
symposium-unveiling-marriage-equality. Homosexuality cases rriay eschew them. Frank-
lin, supra note 5, at 871-72, 881; see Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The "Funda-
mental Right" That Dare Not Speal< Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2003). 
226. See supra notes 160-75 and accompanying text. 
227. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 847-48 (1992) ("It is ... 
tempting ... to suppose that the Due Process Clause protects only those practices, defined 
at the most specific level, that were protected against government interference ... when 
the Fourteenth Amendment was ratified .... But such a view would be inconsistent with 
our law .... "). 
228. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 566-67. 
229. 491 U.S. 110, 127 n.6 (1989) (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.). 
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fore, the Court should broadly define the right to marriage as 
that of two people to marry, rather than a narrow right of same-
• 230 sex marriage. 
CONCLUSION 
Marriage equality swept the nation across 2014, and Virginia 
proved essential to that development. Judge Wright Allen's com-
prehensive decision, which invalidated same-sex marriage pro-
scriptions, and the Fourth Circuit's affirmance of her opinion, 
have brought marriage equality to Virginia and given new mean-
ing to the promises of liberty and equality articulated in Loving 
nearly a half century ago. This has enabled same-sex couples and 
their families, particularly their children, to realize innumerable 
valuable advantages that Virginia formerly bestowed only upon 
opposite-sex couples. Because marriage equality has not yet come 
to some jurisdictions, including a number of which where judges 
have found bans constitutional, thereby permitting different mar-
riage regimes across the nation, the Justices must promptly re-
solve this critical issue. 
230. For a full treatment of this argument, see Brief for Commonwealth of Va. as Ami-
cus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 19-25, Obergefell v. Hodges, _U.S._ (2015) (Nos. 
14-556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574); Brief of Amici Curiae Professors Laurence H. Tribe and 
Michael C. Dorf in Support of Petitioners, Obergefell v. Hodges,_ U.S._ (2015) (Nos. 14· 
556, 14-562, 14-571, 14-574). 
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